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Abstract
Famous medieval philosophers Al-Sijistani and Maimonides argued
that the use of double negation helps us to better understand issues related
to theology. To a modern reader, however, their arguments are somewhat
obscure and unclear. We show that these arguments can be drastically
clarified if we take into account the 20 century use of double negation in
constructive logic.

1

Double Negation Theology:
minder

A Brief Re-

What is double negation theology. Abu Yakub Al-Sijistani (d. 971) and
Moses ibn Maimon (1135–1204), also known as Maimonides, claimed that while
while God is essentially incomprehensible, it is possible to gain some knowledge
of God by using double negation; see, e.g., [15, 19]. For example, one cannot
say that God is good, but it make sense to say that God is not not-good.
Why double negation? The reasoning behind the use of double negation is,
to a modern reader, rather obscure and unclear.
In this short paper, we will show, however, that the use of double negation
can be made much clearer to the modern reader if we take into account the 20
century developments in constructive logic.

2

What Is Constructive Logic: A Reminder

Constructivity in mathematics before the 20 century. Strictly speaking, mathematics is about proving results. However, from the ancient times,
mathematicians were also interested in constructing objects.
The need for constructions is motivated largely by applications. For example,
to predict where a satellite will be at some future moment of time, we need to
1

solve the system of diﬀerential equations describing the satellite’s motion. From
the practical viewpoint, it is not enough to prove the existence of the solution,
we actually need an algorithm for producing such a solution.
Similarly, when we select a control strategy that optimizes our objective
function, it is not enough to prove the existence of an optimal strategy, we need
to actually construct such a strategy.
Need for constructivity has been well understood since the ancient times.
For example, Euclid’s Elements include not only geometric proofs, but also
constructions of diﬀerent geometric objects [8].
Until the 20 century, once the existence of an object satisfying certain properties was proven, eventually a way was found to construct this object. The
resulting construction was sometimes approximate – e.g., it turned out that
we cannot exactly trisect an angle by using only a compass and a rules, only
approximately – but it was possible. From this viewpoint, existence and constructibility were viewed as synonyms.
This belief was best captured by David Hilbert who, in 1900, was asked,
by the world’s mathematical community, to select the list of most important
mathematical challenges for the 20 century mathematics: “In mathematics there
is no ignorabimus” [12].
20th century discovery: constructibility is diﬀerent from existence.
The famous Gödel’s incompleteness theorem [10] showed that, contrary to
Hilbert’s expectations, there are mathematical statements about which we cannot tell whether they are true or false.
This result lead to the conclusion that in some cases, we can prove the
existence of an object, but no algorithm is possible for computing this object;
see, e.g., the famous Turing’s paper [18]. In other words, not everything that
can be proven to exist is constructible.
Two approaches to dealing with the diﬀerence between provable existence and constructibility. Until Gödel’s work, the same existential quantiﬁer ∃x P (x) was assumed to mean two (supposedly) equivalent things:
• provable existence of an object x that satisﬁes the property P (x), and
• a possibility to actually construct an object x with this property.
Once it was realized that these two notions are diﬀerent, two approaches
emerged:
• In the traditional mathematical approach, ∃x P (x) is reserved to mean
provable existence. In this approach, we need special algorithmic analysis
to ﬁnd out what is computable and what is not.
• An alternative approach of constructive logic is to use ∃x P (x) to mean
that we have a construction for generating an object x that satisﬁes the
property P (x).
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Constructive logic approach: details. Historically, constructive logic was
originated by A. N. Kolmogorov [13]; he called it logic of problems. In this logic,
A ∨ B means that we know exactly which of the two statements A and B is
true.
Most statements of constructive logic (except for the simplest ones that do
not contain ∃ or ∨) include the existence of some objects. From this viewpoint,
the truth of an implication A → B not only means that A implies B, it also
means that there exists an algorithm that, given an object whose existence is
implied by the truth of the statement A, constructs an object whose existence
is needed to prove the truth of the statement B – and such an algorithm must
be explicitly provided.
Negation ¬A (as it is often done in logic) is viewed as a particular case of
the implication: namely, as an implication A → F , where F is a known false
statement (e.g., 0 = 1).
Constructive logic is diﬀerent from the classical logic. For example, in classical logic, we have the law of the excluded middle: A ∨ ¬A is always true.
Because of this, a double negation of each statement ¬¬A is, in classical logic,
simply equivalent to the original statement A.
In the constructive logic, this would mean that we know which of the statements A and ¬A is true. Since Gödel proved that it is, in general, not possible
to know – even for statements of the type ∀n P (n), where n goes over natural
numbers and P (n) is an easy-to-test property – we thus, in general, do not have
the law of excluded middle. As a result, in constructive logic, double negation
¬¬A is, in general, diﬀerent from the original statement A.
In constructive logic, we do not have the law of the excluded middle, but
what we do have – as was already proven in [13] – is the double negation of this
law, i.e., a statement ¬¬(A ∨ ¬A).
Moreover, it has been proven [9] that if instead of the logical operations
def
e B def
∨ and ∃, we take their double negations A∨
= ¬¬(A ∨ B) and e
∃x P (x) =
e and e
¬¬(∃x P (x), then for these new operations ∨
∃, we have classical logic.
Constructive logic approach: successes. Constructive logic has been successfully used to describe what can be computed and constructed and what
cannot. This area of research is known as constructive mathematics; see, e.g.,
[1, 4, 5, 7, 14].

3

How Constructive Logic Can Explain Double
Negation Theology

Finite domain vs. inﬁnite domain. The main reason why it is not possible to
have an algorithm deciding which mathematical statements are true and which
are not is that mathematics deals with inﬁnite domains.
If we limit ourselves to a ﬁnite domain D, then it is easy to check whether
in this domain, a statement like ∀xx∈D P (x) or ∃xx∈D P (x): it is suﬃcient to
simply check the corresponding statement P (x) for all ﬁnitely many objects
3

x ∈ D. In an inﬁnite domain – e.g., when D is the set N of all natural numbers
– such direct checking is not possible.
Al-Sijistani’s and Maimonides’s God as a master of an inﬁnite domain.
Where does God ﬁt into this picture? According to both philosophers, God is
a master of an inﬁnite domain, he is aware of what is going on in the inﬁnite
Universe.
Thus, whether we are talking about a set of natural numbers or more complex
inﬁnite sets, Al-Sijistani’s and Maimonides’s God can actually check whether
a property P (x) holds for all the objects x from this inﬁnite set. This is the
only feature of God that we will use in this explanation; from this viewpoint,
Al-Sijistani’s and Maimonides’s God can be viewed simply as a creature that
can check the truth of inﬁnitely many statements in a ﬁnite time.
All other aspects of God we can, for our purposes, safely ignore.
Constructive logic from the viewpoint of Al-Sijistani’s and Maimonides’s God. To understand God means to view things from God’s viewpoint. If we use constructive logic to describe God’s viewpoint, then we do have
each statement A ∨ ¬A true: since, with an ability to check inﬁnitely many
statements, Al-Sijistani’s and Maimonides’s God can check, for each statement
A, whether this statement is true or its negation ¬A is true. This is possible
when A is a statement of the type ∀n P (n), this is possible for more complex
statements such as ∀m ∃n P (m, n), etc.
Thus, constructibility for this superior creature is equivalent to classical
logic, with the law of excluded middle.
Resulting explanation to double negation theology. We humans are only
capable of making ﬁnitely many computational steps in a ﬁnite amount of time.
Since our ability is thus limited, to describe what is constructible and what is
not, we can use constructive logic, with its lack of law of excluded middle.
Al-Sijistani’s and Maimonides’s God is, by deﬁnition, a creature who can
check inﬁnitely many statements in ﬁnite time. As a result, if we want to describe what is constructible for the creature with such ability, then the resulting
logic becomes classical logic, with the law of excluded middle.
In particular, the fact that the law of excluded middle A ∨ ¬A holds in God’s
constructive logic means that Al-Sijistani’s and Maimonides’s God is capable,
given any arithmetic statement A with any number of quantiﬁers, to check
whether this statement is true or not. Gödel’s result shows that, in general, we
cannot check this – which explains Al-Sijistani’s and Maimonides’s statement
that God is, in general, incomprehensible to us.
While (due to our lack of God’s inﬁnite abilities) we cannot check which
statements are true or not, we can, according to the double negation result,
simulate God’s constructive logic by interpreting each of the statement with a
double negation. This is exactly what Al-Sijistani’s and Maimonides’s double
negation theology suggest.
So, constructive logic indeed provides for an explanation of the double negation theology.
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Beyond the double negation theology. A related logic-related theological
idea can be found in Zohar [3], the main book of Kabbalah. According to this
book, in Binah (Understanding), one of ten emanations (sefirot) through which
God reveals himself, God exists as the great “Who” who stands at the beginning
of each question.
This is perfectly in line with the main idea behind Hilbert’s epsilon calculus,
when we introduce a symbol εx P whose meaning is as follows: if ∃x P (x), then
εx P is an object for which the property P (x) is true, i.e., for which P (εx P );
see, e.g., [17]. Of course, this formal idea does not help us actually construct
this object in situations when not such construction is possible, but it helps us
apply techniques of constructive logic to such situations – i.e., in eﬀect, similar to
double negation, it helps us apply techniques of constructive logic in situations
when usual ﬁnite algorithms do not lead to constructions.
Comment. While epsilon calculus is mostly familiar to logicians, many mathematicians are familiar with it via N. Bourbaki’s books, where εx P is denoted
as τx (P ) [6].
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